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Introduction
At the crux of every bioethical discussion is the concept of person. Almost
all agree that it is to persons that rights belong - at least the most
foundational right: the right to life. Non-persons are under no obligations
and do not enjoy rights, at least, not the most essential of rights: life.
The concept of person has undergone great distortion in recent years,
especially due to Cartesian dualism and a post-Enlightenment emphasis on
the individual, absolute autonomy and other related topics. In recent years,
the position has been put forward that there are non-human beings that
have the characteristics of persons, and thus should be accorded
appropriate rights. It has also been argued that not all human beings are
necessarily persons, and that only those who have the requisite
characteristics are due any rights at all - most significantly, the right to
life. Whether that human being in question is an embryo, mentally
impaired, "persistently vegetative," or brain dead, the response of those
who argue in this fashion is always the same: there is no right to life for
such as these. Accordingly, so the argument goes, there is nothing morally
objectionable with ending their lives.
Given the significance of the concept of person, the purpose of this
paper is to explore the modem conception of this word as it is understood
by the controversial philosopher/ethicist Peter Singer, and how he applies
this conception to bioethical discussions, especially to the status of the
human embryo. This paper will begin with a brief discussion of two of
Singer's key presuppositions. I will then summarize his thought on person,
specifically looking at his thought as it regards the right to life of all human
beings qua human beings.) Secondly, I will examine the ramifications and
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applications that these thoughts have for the human embryo, particularly
regarding research on the human embryo. Thirdly, I will criticize Singer's
position, especially by exposing his inadequate concept of person and the
failure to make certain key distinctions in his definitions. Fourthly, I will
reference the thought of Pope John Paul II and the Second Vatican Council
to once again make clear the intrinsic value of human life, including the life
of someone as small as a human embryo.

Peter Singer's Presuppositions
As of this writing, Peter Singer is a professor at Princeton University
in New Jersey. He has attracted much attention in recent years, not only
with his views regarding animal rights, but also, and more important, his
view that euthanasia and infanticide should be allowed. 2 To Singer's credit,
at least he comes right out and says what he thinks, rather than hiding
behind euphemisms or politically correct slogans. He matter-of-factly says
that it is time we abandon the concept that human life is sacred simply
because it is human. 3
In his Rethinking Life and Death: The Collapse of Our Traditional
Ethics, he proposes five "new commandments" to replace five old ones. 4
The last of these "new commandments" is that we should not "discriminate
on the basis of species."5 He writes:
We cannot justifiably give more protection to the life of a human
being than we give to a nonhuman animal, if the human being clearly
ranks lower on any possible scale of relevant characteristics than the
animal.. .. The right to life is not a right of members of the species
Homo sapiens; it is ... a right that properly belongs to persons. Not all
members of the species Homo sapiens are persons, and not all
persons are members of the species Homo sapiens.6

It is necessary, he maintains, to "recognize that from the point of
view of the different beings themselves, each life is of equal value." While
it is true, for example, that a man may be able to study philosophy, whereas
a mouse cannot, this does not mean that the pleasures a mouse has are of
less value to the mouse than the pleasures of the man engrossed in
philosophy. The only way to determine the greatness of man over and
against the mouse, he claims, would be to "find some neutral ground, some
impartial standpoint from which we can make the comparison." While this
may seem an insurmountable problem, Singer does not think. it is. He
proposes that we imagine a "peculiar property" that allows us to have the
experiences, say, of a horse. Then, that same "property" enables us to have
the experiences of a man. Finally, we are able to enter a third "state",
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wherein we are able to recall what our experiences were like in both of the
other "states." On the basis of this, he argues, "I think I can make some
sense of the idea of choosing."7And that choice, he will conclude, will not
always come out on the side of the man.
Where do ideas like these come from? It is important to make
explicit two presuppositions that are operative in his thought, and which
give rise to ideas like the ones expressed above. The first key
presupposition of Singer's is that there is no god.8 The world as we know it
has not come into existence from some master plan, let alone from some
loving and saving god. Instead, all is to chance, all is random. 9 In an
illuminating statement he writes
In what sense does rejection in belief in a god imply rejection of the
view that life has any meaning? If this world had been created by
some divine being with a particular goal in mind, it could be said to
have meaning, at least for that divine being. If we could know what
the divine being's purpose in creating us was, we could then know
what the meaning of our life was for our creator. If we accepted our
creator's purpose (though why we should do that would need to be
explained) we could claim to know the meaning of life. lo

Because there is no god, then, ultimately there is no point. "Life as a whole
has no meaning." !!
The second presupposition, flowing logically from the first, is that
human life is not unique. Since there is no god, there is no possibility of
human beings created in that god's image and likeness. There is, in
addition, no possibility of human beings participating in god's divine life,
since there is no such life. And finally, there is no ultimate destination
after this life.! 2 Singer is a firm believer in Darwinism, one particular
theory of evolution that claims life has evolved not simply within a
particular species but trans-species. 13 Darwin, Singer writes, should have
given a "final blow" to any suggestion that human life is at the center of the
universe. Darwin has "taught us that we too were animals, and had a
natural origin as the other animals did ... (t)he differences between us and
the nonhuman animals are differences of degree and not kind." !4 He
continues
We like to think of ourselves as the darlings of the universe. We do
not like to think of ourselves as a species of animal. But the truth is
that there is no unbridgeable gulf between us. Instead there is an
overlap .. .This is not my subjective value-judgment. It is a statement
offa ct that can be tested and verified over and over again.1 5
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The theory of evolution, he says, is one that is "accepted by all serious
biological scientists." 16 Near the conclusion of his Practical Ethics he
offers a summary of his thought: "Life began, as the best available theories
tell us, in a chance combination of molecules; it then evolved through
random mutations and natural selection. All this just happened; it did not
happen for any overall purpose."1 7
It should not be hard to see, given all these presuppositions, why
Singer thinks it is so illogical to discriminate on the basis of species. If we
all came from the same primordial slime, and if it was only due to a matter
of chance and happenstance that some of that slime evolved to a higher
level, then there is nothing that marks us as distinct merely on the basis of
our species. There must be something else, some other characteristics,
whereby we can rank beings without discriminating. And these
characteristics will not be unique to the species Homo sapiens. So,
returning to our earlier example, perhaps the horse or the mouse will turn
out to have greater value and worth than a particular human being,
depending on crucial characteristics.
Regarding the concept of "person", the following can be offered as a
summary of Singer's thought:
1) There are certain characteristics that are absolutely

necessary to maintain that an individual (of whatever
species) is a person.
2) An embryo does not have these necessary characteristics.
3) Therefore, the embryo is not a person.
4) Since an embryo is not a person it does not enjoy the
right to life (which all persons enjoy).

Characteristics Necessary to Be a Person
Singer writes that the term "person" is one that is likely to mislead
most people. IS This is so because we typically equate "person" with
"human being." However, as we saw above, the two are not synonymous.
There are persons who are not humans. And there are humans who are not
persons. 19 Who, then, is a person? What are the requirements for being
one? These are crucial questions, he writes, since he acknowledges that the
term "is no mere descriptive label. It carries with it a certain moral
standing."20
Singer offers a brief, and far from adequate, survey of the history of
the term "person". He inaccurately notes that "person" has its origins "in
the Latin term for a mask worn by an actor in classical drama."21From this
origin, he writes, the term was introduced into more common usage by the
philosopher Epictetus, "who used it to mean the role one plays in life."22
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With Christianity, and the struggle to expound upon concepts like the
Trinity and the Incarnation, the term grew in its meaning. From these
discussions, Singer concludes, it became clear that "person" did not
necessarily refer to a human, since it could also be used of God the Father
and God the Holy Spirit, neither of whom were human.23 Looking to the
Oxford Dictionary, Singer finds there a definition having "impeccable
philosophical precedents": a person is "a self-conscious or rational being."
Primarily, however, Singer sees John Locke's definition of person as the
crucial one. A person, according to Locke, is "a thinking intelligent being
that has reason and reflection and can consider itself as itself, the same
thinking being, in different times and places."24 Two notions come to the
fore in this definition: rationality and self-consciousness. Indeed, he says,
these notions are "the core of the concept."25
Starting with these thoughts, then, Singer writes that he will use the
term "person" to refer to a "rational and self-conscious being", and not
necessarily a "member of the species Homo sapiens." But there is more.
Singer also draws heavily upon the thought of Michael Tooley.26
According to Tooley, "the only beings who have a right to life are those
who can conceive of themselves as distinct entities existing over time."27
This was tied, in Tooley's original thoughts, to the possession of desires.28
While he acknowledged that it is difficult to express the specific
connection that exists between rights and desires, Tooley initially believed
that "the possession of a right must in some way be linked to the capacity
to have the relevant desires."29 Thus, "only a being who is capable of
conceiving herself as a distinct entity existing over time - that is, only a
person - could have this desire. Therefore only a person could have a
right to life."30
However, Tooley's initial position on this matter, as expressed in his
1972 article "Abortion and Infanticide," changed. In a later book, with the
same title, his thought was that an individual cannot at a given time - say,
now - have a right to continued existence unless the individual is of a kind
such that it can now be in its interests that it continue to exist. 31While one
might be tempted to think that this will mean the fetus in the womb is thus
to be considered a person under this new understanding, Tooley argues that
it does not. Why? Because, as Singer explains
[ am not the infant from whom [ developed. The infant could not look
forward to developing into the kind of being I am, or even into an
intermediate being ... I cannot even recall being the infant; there are
no mental links between us . Continued existence cannot be in the
interests of a being who never has had the concept of a continuing
selfY
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To sum up, then, to be a person, and to have a right to life, "one must
have, or at least at one time have had, the concept of having a continued
existence." In this way, Tooley and Singer claim, the counterexample of a
sleeping man is answered. This is so because the sleeping man has had the
concept of having a continued existence?3
Having started with Locke's definition, then, Singer has gone on to
borrow two other characteristics (from Tooley) that must be present to
consider one a person: the capacity to evisage one's future, and having
desires and interests related to that future. To these he adds one other
essential characteristic, that of autonomy. By "autonomy" Singer means
"the capacity to choose, to make and act on one's own decisions." Relating
this to the right to life, he writes, "only a being who can grasp the
difference between dying and continuing to live can autonomously choose
to live."34
Singer also discusses the concept of consciousness, but this concept
does not necessarily mean that the individual is rational or selfconscious.35 Consciousness, or the condition of being sentient, means the
ability to experience pleasure or pain. Such an individual is not necessarily
a person. Many nonhuman animals fit this category, he says, as well as
newborn and some mentally impaired humans. This ability to experience
pleasure and pain, while not making the thing a person, and thus not giving
it the right to hfe, does not mean, however, that it is never wrong to kill
them. 36 The argumentation for his reasoning is that, quite simply, "a life
without consciousness is of no worth at all." The same can be said about "a
life that has no possibility of mental, social or physical interaction with
other human beings."37
In summary, then, looking at Singer's thought, the following can be
said about the necessary characteristics of a person. A person must be
rational and self-conscious. It must be able to conceive of itself as a distinct
entity existing over time. It must be of a kind such that it can now be in its
interests to continue to exist. It must have mental links between its
experiences now and those from earlier times. It must have the ability to
experience pleasure. These characteristics, it is claimed, are found in some
- but not all - humans. Likewise, these characteristics are found in some
- but not all - nonhuman animals. 38 If one does not have these
characteristics, then one is not a person . And if one is not a person, then
one does not have the right to life.

The Status of the Human Embryo in Light of These Characteristics
With the characteristics for being considered a person in place, then,
I wish to address the status ofthe human embryo in Singer's thought. In the
first edition of his Practical Ethics, Chapter Six dealt only with the issue of
280
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abortion. However, with the advent of in-vitro fertilization (lVF) many
things have changed and reproductive technology has opened up new
vistas. Accordingly, in the second edition, Chapter Six deals with the
human embryo in a larger context. He admits there is great need to address
the status of the human embryo, for, in 1994, Singer estimated that there
were as many as 11,000 frozen embryos in Australia alone. Given the
potential for research that could be done with these human embryos, and
the great benefits that could come to the human race, what are we to make
of these?39 Are they to be afforded special status? The key to answering that
question cannot lie in the fact that they are human embryos, since, as we
saw above, he rejects the claim that human life is sacred. Thus, there must
be some other way of determining their worth.
Because the situation of the embryo is similar to that of the fetus,
Singer first lays out the argument that is often used by "conservatives" to
argue against abortion. This argument goes as follows:
• First premise: It is wrong to kill an innocent human being.
• Second premise: A human fetus is an innocent human being.
• Conclusion: Therefore it is wrong to kill a human fetus.
Usually, he writes, it is the second premise that is challenged or
denied by those who are arguing for abortion rights, or for the ability to do
research on an embryo.40 In trying to determine whether there is a "morally
significant dividing line" between the embryo and the child, those in favor
of abortion rights often look to one of three suggestions for that "dividing
line": birth, viability, and quickening. However, in looking at each of these,
Singer concludes that the "conservative" position is "on solid ground."
There is, indeed, evidence to show that "the development from the embryo
to the infant is a gradual process ."41
Singer then examines common "liberal" arguments in favor of
abortion (e.g., restrictive laws lead to back-alley abortions; the regulation
of morality is not the law 's business ; the feminist's cry, "It's my
body! ").~2 But here again, he writes (with the possible exception of Judith
Jarvis Thompson 's argument, and even this he does not accept entire1y43)
the " liberals" fail to offer a morally significant reason justifying
abortion.44
However, Singer argues, the problem lies with the fact that the
second premise is not the right one to challenge. Instead, the first one is!
Because of the sense of the sanctity of human life, this premise has not
been challenged until now. But now, with the "collapse of our traditional
ethic," a new Copernican revolution is taking place. 45 "The beliefthat mere
membership of our species, irrespective of other characteristics, makes a
great difference to the wrongness of killing a being is a legacy of religious
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doctrines ... "46 This religious sense, however, is now eroding and is being
revealed as a bias due to "species-ism." The term "human" straddles two
distinct notions: being a member of the species Homo sapiens, and being a
person. 47 Since humans are not necessarily persons, they have no special
right to life simply because they are human.
In making the distinction that not all human life is sacred simply
because it is human, the second premise is also now open to challenge: the
fetus is not a person (though it is a member of the human species). This is
so because a fetus is not rational or self-conscious. Free from the bias of
"species-ism", "we can now look at the fetus for what it is - the actual
characteristics it possesses - and can value its life on the same scale as the
lives of those beings with similar characteristics who are not members of
our species."48
Having said all this, Singer acknowledges that there is likely to be a
cry that his arguments do not take into account the "potential"
characteristics of the fetus , and thus is not sufficient. Indeed, "On the basis
of its actual characteristics, some opponents of abortion will admit, the
fetus compares unfavorably with many non-human animals; it is when we
consider its potential to become a mature human being that membership of
the species Homo sapiens becomes important, and the fetus far surpasses
any chicken, pig or calf."49
Singer agrees that the fetus is a potential human being. This does not
mean, though, that the fetus "has a stronger claim to life. There is no rule
that says that a potential X has the same value as an X, or has all the rights
of an X." Further on he makes his thought more specific: "In the absence of
any general inference from 'A is a potential X' to 'A has the rights of an X',
we should not accept that a potential person should have the rights of a
person, unless we can be given some specific reason why this should hold
in this particular case."50 But what could these reasons be? The
characteristics that are necessary for one to be a person do not apply to a
fetus, since a fetus "is not now and never ... (has) been capable of seeing"
itself as a distinct entity with a past and a future. Thus, Singer concludes,
he has "no idea" what significance there could be in the fact that a fetus is
a potential human being.s'
What holds true for the status of a fetus is applicable as well to the
status of a human embryo. The arguments are basically the same, though
the wording is different. Singer states that those who oppose research on
human embryos tend to argue in one of two ways, either 1) the embryo is
entitled to special protection because it is a human being, or, 2) the embryo
is entitled to special protection because it is a potential human being. 52
However, the first argument can be attributed to species-ism, and thus
discarded, and the second argument, since it did not apply when the object
in question was a fetus, is even less applicable now that the object is an
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embryo. "If the fetus is not a person, it is even more apparent that an
embryo is not a person."53
In an attempt to give further support to his argument against the
special protection due a human embryo, Singer makes two additional
points. The first has to do with the phenomenon of "twinning." His claim
here is that a "person" is an individual, but the embryo is clearly not
individual, at least not until after 14 days, at which point the possibility of
"twinning" is over. Because of this factor, he claims, it is impossible for
anyone to argue for a continuity of existence from conception into
adulthood. The embryo is not an individual, but only "a cluster of cells."54
The second additional argument has to do with the concept of
potentiality. Whereas before IVF it was impossible to imagine an embryo
existing outside a mother's womb, now it is. Is the status of an embryo in the
womb and the embryo in a petri dish the same, with regards to potentiality?
Singer seems to argue no. And if we are talking about potentiality, why do we
limit the discussion to the embryo? Why not discuss the potentiality of the
sperm or the egg alone? "If the embryo is a potential person, why are not the
egg-and-sperm, considered jointly, also a potential person?,,55

Summary of Singer's Thought
At this point, before offering a critique of Peter Singer'S thought,
allow me to summarize what has been said. First, in Peter Singer's world,
there is no god. Since there is no god, there is no plan, no purpose, no
destiny, and ultimately, no point. Man, as he exists in this purposeless and
pointless world, is but one species among many: he is not unique. All has
come from the slime of the earth, some evolving this way, some that way.
To the extent that man has certain characteristics - e.g. rationality, selfconsciousness, having the concept of a continued existence with memory
links - he is a person. But other species, too, can have members that meet
these characteristics, and thus, there are persons who are not human. The
human embryo, since it does not have any of these characteristics, is not a
person, though it is a member of the human species. This membership,
however, is no longer to be regarded as of great significance, since we have
been freed from a religious sense that accorded special dignity to man
being made in god's image and likeness. Since, then, the human embryo is
not a person, it does not enjoy special protection; indeed, it does not have a
right to life. In fact, there is great potential for using these embryos to
further help those who do have the characteristics necessary to be persons.
In this world of Peter Singer, then, perhaps one day we will use the stem
cells or organs of a human embryo who does not fit the criteria for being a
person, to help prolong the life of a pig or a chimpanzee, who does.
November, 2003
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In critiquing the truly frightening thought of Peter Singer, I will take
the following path. I will begin by looking at his definition of person, then
move to a critique of his understanding of potentiality, offer a response to
his views on "twinning", and finally comment on his presuppositions.

Person: Indebted to Christianity
As I mentioned above, Singer offers a truly inadequate survey of the
history of the term "person." This is significant, since it will be on the basis
of this term (and the essential characteristics entailed) that he will
detennine who has the right to life. The concept of "person" did indeed
originate in antiquity, most probably with the Etruscans, where it had a
religious sense. It later came to be used by the Greeks, who used it in the
way that Singer mentions, and finally the Romans adopted it as a way of
referring more to those with legal rights. However, it is impossible to
overstate the debt that this concept owes to Christianity, and, in particular,
to the thought of Christians regarding the Incarnation and the Trinity.56 In
his Introduction to Christianity, Joseph Ratzinger writes, "The concept and
idea of ' person' dawned on the human mind in no other way than in the
struggle over the Christian image of God and the interpretation of the
figure of Jesus of Nazareth."57 Singer entirely fails to pay attention to the
significant contributions of Christianity to this term. Most particularly, he
misses the key contribution: the notion that at its highest level, i.e. , in God
Person is the pure relation of being related, nothing else.
Relationship is not something extra added to the person, as it is
with us; it only exists at all as relatedness ... In this idea ...
Christian thought discovered the kernel of the concept of person
which describes something other and infinitely more than the
mere idea of the "individual."58

In paying his respects to Christian thought, the only thing that seems
to be significant for Singer is that Christianity concluded that "person"
need not refer to a human being, since it was used to refer to God the
Father, God the Son, and God the Holy Spirit. There is no mention of the
newness that the term took on, no discussion of the importance of relatio.
In fact, there is no intellectual honesty at all regarding his discussion of the
historical development of the term. In addition there is this note of
inconsistency: Singer argues that the term "person" can refer to nonhumans. The basis for this argument is that even Christians use the term to
refer to the members of the Trinity. Singer, however, denies the existence of
the Trinity, and, yet, he still uses this as his justification for saying we can
use "person" to refer to non-humans.
284
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Given his rejection of Christianity it is no surprise that Singer overemphasizes the aspect of the individual as someone entirely distinct,
almost entirely unrelated to any other. As Francis Martin ominously warns,
without a conception of person that sees the importance of relation, as it
does in Christian thought, "the person remains inchoate, the dignity of
personhood remains insubstantial, and ... the human person can find no
other existential ground for the recognition of its dignity ... This is the story
of every totalitarian state."59
There is more to critique in Singer's understanding of "person",
however, than just his failure to recognize the debt he owes to Christian
thought and its understanding of the essentialness of relation. Luke
Gormally offers a helpful critique of those who commonly define person
the way Singer does.
Such thinkers trade on the word "person", although they define it
wrongly in terms of characteristics which may come and go and
which are a matter of degree. For a person is a substantial individual
being with his own identity, which he has as an individual of a
particular species. In our case the species is "human being." Having
named an individual human being we use the name with the same
reference so long as it is the same human being we are talking about.
A human being is a person because the kind to which he belongs is
characterized by a rational nature . . . One is a person just by being of
thi s kind, and that does indeed import a tremendous dignity.60

This sense of the word, Gormally continues, is one that has long ago been
"thrashed out", and it is not now possible to so casually define it anew. A
person, he argues, is not like a piece of iron that can go through one process
and become a magnet, and then go through another process and no longer
be a magnet, though it is still the same piece of iron.
If indeed you explain the word "person" as meaning someone e.g.
who can talk (has self-consciousness) and lead a social life (have
inter-personal relations) you may say that someone can be the same
human being but no longer a person. It does not come so easy to say
"Since he can no longer do such-and-such, he no longer has rights,
and it is in order to kill him."6\

Patrick Lee, writing against the modem usage of "person", offers the
following insight: "A person can be defined as an 'intelligent and free
subject.' Every intelligent and free subject is an entity whom we ought to
respect, and whose good or fulfillment we ought to will for his or her own
sake, rather than treat as a mere means." In this definition, it is essential to
understand that the words "intelligent" and "free subject" do not
November, 2003
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necessarily mean that the entity is "actually thinking and willing", but
rather "has the capacity to do so." Since human embryos have "the basic
capacity" to think and will, they are persons. Certainly, it is true that it will
be some time before they "exercise those capacities", but "they are actively
developing themselves to the point at which they will perform such acts."62
On the basis of this, Lee argues that the claim of Singer and others (i.e., the
claim that the fetus, or human embryo, possesses none of the necessary
characteristics for being a person) "can be disputed." It is possible to argue
that a human embryo has "the potentiality of exercising the functions
referred to" in those characteristics. 63
In addition, Lee adds, "a human person is an intelligent and free,
living, organic body." Against any and all claims of dualism,64 Lee
maintains that bodiliness is not some property that a person has; "being an
organism is what a human person is." "As a consequence, the organism
which a person is cannot come to be or cease to be at a different time than
the time at which the person comes to be or ceases to be."6s
Perhaps most alarming about Singer'S understanding of person is
that his characteristics are "selective."66 They are entirely arbitrary. Who
decides which characteristics are significant? And to what degree must
they be present? In such a system, ultimately, it will fall into the hands of
those with the power to make such decisions. As Martin wrote above, this
is the backbone of totalitarianism. Lee rightly adds that "the claim that only
things which have certain traits are full-fledged members of the moral
community is a substantive moral claim ... (those who hold this) would
have to show ... why having those characteristics is a necessary condition
for having basic moral rights."67 Singer fails to do this.

Desires and Interests
We saw above that Singer draws upon the thought, even as it evolved,
of Michael Tooley in expanding his definition of "person." Tooley initially
emphasized the aspect of desire, specifically, in this case, the desire for the
right to life. However, as Tooley saw that there were problems with this
line of argument, he modified his position. His new view said that rights
are based on interests. This does not mean, however, as we saw already,
that the embryo has an interest in its life continuing. Why? Because "a
thing can be in one's interests only if the possession of that thing makes
possible the satisfaction of other desires existing at some time in that
individual." Since, in Tooley's thought (upon which Singer relies) the
human embryo and the child it becomes are not "identical subjects of
experience" (since the embryo is not a subject of conscious experiences of
any kind), the embryo has no right to life. There is, the argument continues,
no psychological continuity between the two. 6S
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Lee responds to this nonsense in devastating fashion. First he attacks
the way Tooley (and thus Singer) connects desires, interests and rights. Lee
poses the scenario of someone who is enduring slavery. Why, he asks,
"should the fact that enslavement fru strates desires for things other than
freedom or lack of enslavement be the explanation of the essential wrong
in this case? Doesn ' t that misplace the violation? Isn' t the violation of
freedom in itself a violation of rights, independently of whether it leads to
the fru stration of other desires?" Lee answers saying, "It seems more
reasonable to hold that the violation of someone's rights is more closely
connected with what truly harms the individual than with what he or she
desires." The "decisive question" is whether or not an individual is harmed
or deprived of something that is "trul y" (i.e. independent of what I may
think) a real benefit to that individual. Such real benefits include life,
health, knowledge, and friend ship. "One cannot, then, use the alleged
connection between rights and desires . . . as a way of establishing the
extension of rights."69
Lee also attacks the argument that there is no psychological
continuity between the embryo and the child it becomes. He does this in
four steps that are directed against a dualistic view of the person and body.
The first step "points out that it is the same 'I' which understands and
which senses or perceives . .. It is the self-same agent which performs both
actions."70 The second step is to argue that perceiving is "a bodily act." By
this, Lee means to say not that perceiving is done only "by 'a mere body' as
opposed to a soul," but that "perception is an act performed by a physical
organism by means of a bodily organ." This act of perceiving, contrary to a
Cartesian understanding, is not "a purely mental act."71 The third step
follow s immediately from the second: if "perceiving is a bodily, organic
activity, it follows that what does the sensing or perceiving is a bodily
thing, that is, an organism."72 The last step is to say, "If that which
understands and is self-conscious is identical with that which senses or
perceives, and that which senses or perceives is a physical organism, it
follow s that that which understands and is self-conscious ... is a physical
organism."73 As a result, the view of Tooley and Singer is mistaken, for they
identify "the person as a subject of consciousness or experience, a subject
that is somehow associated with the human organism but is other than it.
But since the human person is essentially an organi sm, one cannot hold
that the human organism comes to be at one time while the person comes
to be at a later time."74

Potentiality: Active and Passive
We saw above that Singer addresses, or at least claims to address, the
argument that an embryo is a potential person. Tooley (Singer's influence
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for this) had made the distinction between the kind of potentiality that a
sleeping man has and that of a fetus (or embryo). Only that kind that a
sleeping man has, he argued, has a right to life. What the sleeping man has
Tooley calls "capacity", while what the fetus (embryo) has he calls
"potentiality." The sleeping man has the "capacity" for being rational and
self-conscious, except at the time of sleeping, when that "capacity" is
"blocked."75 "Potentiality", on the other hand, requires some sort of change
to occur in the entity, which would entail more than just the removal of
some "blockage."76 So, as Lee summarizes Tooley's thought, "One must
have the capacity for higher mental functions (rationality, selfconsciousness) in order to have a right to life; those entities that have only
the potentiality for such acts do not have a right to life."n
However, as Lee writes, even Tooley came to see that there were
strong arguments to show that his position was eIToneous. For example, it
would not be accurate to say that a person in an iITeversible coma has had
his capacity for self-consciousness blocked by some other factor. Lee
points to the fact that often such persons have damage to the brain and
require "self repair", and not a mere stimulus from outside. Such persons,
Lee argues, "fit the definition of having a mere potentiality for mental acts
rather than having a capacity for them."78
Lee further doubts whether or not there is even any real "moral
significance" in making the distinctions between these two terms. 79
Instead, what is of moral significance is the distinction between active and
passive potentialities. 80 But before distinguishing between these two, it is
worth asking why having the capacity, or active potentiality, for higher
mental functions, like rationality and self-consciousness, is so important. It
can only be, Lee says, for one of two reasons : either 1) because the
capacity, or potentiality, is in itself intrinsically valuable, or 2) because the
entity that possesses the capacity, or active potentiality, is itself an
intrinsically valuable entity. If 1) is true, then that means that the organism
having the capacity, or active potentiality, is something like "a vehicle",
carrying the capacity. But this cannot be true, for a person cannot be a
vehicle for something else of intrinsic worth. If 2) is true, then the thing
"must be intrinsically valuable from the moment that it exists. Nothing can
come to be at one time but become intrinsically valuable, and hence
acquire rights, at another time."81
What of the pivotal distinction between active and passive
potentiality? Tooley defines "active" potentiality as "a condition in which
an entity has all of the positive factors necessary for an action, lacking only
the appropriate circumstances for its exercise."82 Lee says it is more
accurate to say that "active" potentiality refers to "the ability to do
something", whereas "passive" potentiality refers to "the ability to undergo
a certain change from another." And he continues
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The potentialities spec ifi c to li ving thin gs are active potentialities.
They are potentialitie of an o rga ni sm to act not o n another but on
itse lf: in nOUlishment , growt h. a nd se lf-motion , the object of the act.
in the sense of w hat is deve loped or performed by the ac ti o n. is the
same as the thi ng th at perform s the ac ti o n 8J

As specifically regard s a human fetus (or e mbryo), it would be true
to say, ' The re is a se nse in whi ch the fetus does not have an active
pote ntiality to perform hi gher mental acts." To illustrate thi s, Lee uses the
example that in the same way that a child cannot breathe until it develops
lungs, so it cannot perform hi gher me ntal acts (e.g. self-consciousness)
until the brain develops. This, however, is only half of the story.
But the re is also a rea l and important sense in w hi ch the fetus does
have the act ive potenti a lity to pe rform such acts . The human e mbryo
is no t in the same cond iti o n as , say. a canine embryo o r fe tu s. The
can ine e mbryo never w ill perform higher mental ac ts, and does not
have within itse lf the pos iti ve factor required fo r actively developing
it self to the point w he re it wi ll perform such ac ts. whereas the human
embryo a lready has that pos iti ve factor w ithin him se lf or herse lf. The
li ving thing is dy nami c. and it has wi thin itself the source of what it
w ill become. True, it needs rood , a certa in type of atmosp here. and so
o n. BUI g ive n these materials . it ac ti ve ly deve lops itself to its mature
size and s tru c ture . ~4

As Lee continues, he argues th at while it is true to say that in order for an
embryo to be able to pelform action Z, action s X and Y must take place,
but the embryo is already in the process of doing X.
This notion of " potenti ality" is a key one, since "our actions, our
choices, primaril y bear upon potentialities, on what can or would be ."85
Disc ussing the criterion for personhood, Lee writes, "(T)he goods which
one must pursue and respect are fundamentally aspects of what pe rsons
can be; that is, they are vari ou potentialities or possibilities to which
persons are naturally oriented. Therefore, a person, a being with full moral
standing. comes to be when a thing which has these potentialities comes to
be." 6
So, the n, both in the case of a human fetus and a hum an embryo, you
are dealing with a person. Why? Because both are rational and free agents
- not, as we saw earlier in that they are actually thinking and willing, but
" because they are identical with the things which at a later time reason and
freely choose, and they are ac tively developing the mselves to the point
where they will perform suc h ac ts."87 Life is something that is a
potentiality "for this very being, even though it may take thi s being many
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years to actualize those potentialities. Indeed these beings are even now
actively developing themselves to the point at which they will realize" this
perfection. 88
This is not to say that such an individual potentiality has the
necessary characteristics which would make it a person. If this were so,
then this would simply mean that such a being is a potential person. But
that is not the case. "Rather, being a thing which has the potentiality
rationally to pursue these various goods (e.g. life, knowledge, friendship) is
what confers actual personhood, and human embryos... have that
characteristic actually, not just potentially."89

Twinning
Singer, as we saw above, also argued that an embryo could not
possibly be considered a person since a person must be an individual, and
an embryo is not an individual until after 14 days. Until 14 days have
lapsed, and the "primitive streak" appears, there is still the possibility of
"twinning", i.e. that phenomenon whereby from one original zygote two or
more human individuals could derive having the same genetic makeup. On
the basis of this, Singer claimed it was absurd to argue for personhood,
since you cannot argue for any continuity of existence. 90 "While this entity
may be biologically and genetically human and distinct from its parents, it
is not yet an ontologically distinct human individual person. Rather, it is a
colony of individual cells, each capable of developing into a distinct human
person."91
There are a number of responses that can be made with regards to the
phenomenon of "twinning."92 However, for our purposes, I will rely only
upon the thought of Patrick Lee as it is expressed in his Abortion and
Unborn Human Life. There, he analyzes four different objections against
the notion that the developing embryo is not a human person. 93 Each of
these is worth reading. However, since Singer's primary objection has to do
with the claim that the zygote is not an individual until the "primitive
streak" appears, I will summarize only Lee's response to this issue.
Lee notes that the source of much of our confusion is that we fail to
understand what exactly is being meant when we say that a person is an
"individual." To say this, he writes, is not to speak physically but logically:
an individual is one who is logically undivided. 94 The fact that the zygote
can divide shows only that it is physically divisible; but all of us are
physically divisible, at every stage of our life, and this does not call into
question the fact that we are individuals. 95
From the fact that A can split into Band C, it simply does not follow,
nor does the fact at all suggest, that A was not an individual before
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the division. It may be that A ceases to be and Band C come to be
from the constituents that once went into A (though this is not the
most likely situation), or that A is identical with B or C. But the facts
simply do not suggest that A did not exist or was not yet individual. 96

As William May writes, the objection of Singer, and others, is "based
on appearances and alleged common sense, but it fails to prove what it
claims to prove. It is far more likely... that identical twinning is a
developmental accident and that the coming into being of identical twins
can be explained reasonably as a mode of asexual reproduction." Thus,
while it may be true that "some human individuals begin to be between
fertilization and implantation ... most human individuals do come to be at
fertilization/conception; it is reasonable to hold that they do and
unreasonable to hold that they do not."97 Indeed, Lee adds, "Only at
fertilization, with the fusion of sperm and ovum, is there any event which
could be construed as imposing unity on what was previously manifold. In
effect, the hypothesis (of Singer et al.) amounts to saying that fertilization
is not completed until the primitive stage streak. But there is a wealth of
evidence to go against this presupposition."98

Singer's Presuppositions
Peter Singer is representative of what Pope John Paul II calls "the
heart of the tragedy being experienced by modem man: the eclipse of the
sense of God and man." Indeed, the Holy Father writes, "when the sense of
God is lost, there is also a tendency to lose the sense of man, of his dignity
and his life." In such a situation
man is no longer able to see himself as "mysteriously different" from
other earthly creatures; he regards himself merely as one more living
being, as an organism which, at most, has reached a very high stage
of perfection. Enclosed in the narrow horizon of his physical nature,
he is somehow reduced to being "a thing", and no longer grasps the
"transcendent" character of his "existence as man." He no longer
considers life as a splendid gift of God, something "sacred" entrusted
to his responsibility and thus also to his loving care and "veneration."
Life itself becomes a mere "thing."99

In looking at Singer's presuppositions, I wish to touch on three
points. First, his thoughts on God, and His supposed non-existence, are not
scientific ones ; they are, rather, a philosophy, a worldview. In saying that
he does not believe in "god," Singer is not talking about Zeus, or Moloch,
or Baal. His rejection of the existence of God is clearly directed at the God
November, 2003

291

of Judeo-Christian belief, and more specifically at the God of Jesus
Christ. 100 But there is no basis upon which he can subject Christianity to a
"repeatable experiment."IOI The event that is the life, death, resurrection
and ascension of Jesus Christ is unique. The point here is simply to make
clear that Singer is speaking dogmatically about something that is in fact
philosophical.
The second point regarding Singer's presuppositions has to do with
his statements regarding man. As was noted above, Singer subscribes to
Darwin's theory of evolution. This is something that he claims "all serious
biologists" hold. Two things need to be made clear here. First, again Singer
is speaking dogmatically. Darwinian evolution is not a science, it is a
theory, a worldview, and one that is unabashedly rooted in anti-Christian
thought. ,02 Second, it is quite simply not true that "all serious biologists"
buy into Darwin 's theory. In fact, the more that we come to know about
genetics, the more it seems that Darwin's theories are absurd, at least so far
as they involve evolution that takes place across different species. 103 Yet,
Singer writes as if Darwin's theories are proven, and that if you think
otherwise you are either ignorant, an imbecile, or holding on to some
horrible religious superstition.
The last point, however, is perhaps the most important one to make.
Singer seems to thoroughly misunderstand the nature of authority, whether
that authority belongs to God (or "god" for him) or to man. "Authority",
for the modern mind, has become synonymous with "domination." As
such, anyone in such a position is seen as a threat to another's
individualism and "freedom."'04 But authority (or "causality") is not equal
to domination. God is the ultimate Authority; He is the First Cause.
Contrary to Singer's understanding, this God always and only acts out of
love and generosity.,05 Creation is not something that He "plays with,"
rather it is something that He loves, allowing it to share in His own divine
life. It is indeed something that He died for.
It is similar with man's authority, which Singer is so intent on
rejecting. Man has not received the right to dominate the earth, as Singer
seems to think that the Biblical account of creation indicates. ,06 Instead,
man has received the task of stewardship. It is part of man's role on earth to
be a visible representative of the One whose Image and Likeness he bears.
And since that God is generous and creative and loving and compassionate,
never arbitrarily making moral decisions, so too must man be. To the extent
that man has failed in this task, he is guilty, and surely will be held
accountable in some way (in fact we already suffer for it by the state of the
earth). 107
In the end, the ultimate truth of man is this: he is "the only creature
on earth that God has wanted for its own sake",08; his dignity "rests above
~ 1] on the fact that he is called to communion with God ... as soon as he
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comes into being" 109; hi s intrinsic worth is measured by the fact that he has
"gained so great a Redeemer. .. (and that) God ' gave his only Son' in order
that (he) 'should not peri sh but have eternal life ' ." 11 0 When these are not
recogni zed, or are ignored, as Peter Singer does , then there is ultimately no
foundation upon whi ch to build, no grounding of man 's obligations and
rights. Rather, all becomes arbitrary. And in such a world, ultimatel y, all
becomes meaningless.
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